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1. The connection between sacred and civil law 
 
In the summer of 47 BC, two prominent Roman senators met on the island of Samos, off the 
coast of Asia Minor: Marcus Iunius Brutus and Servius Sulpicius Rufus. Brutus is best known 
as a politician and as one of the murderers of C. Iulius Caesar, Rufus as the top jurist of his 
time. In the previous year, both had been supporters of Pompey and both had fled to the East 
after the battle of Pharsalos when Pompey had been beaten by Caesar. Rufus had withdrawn 
to the island of Samos, where he awaited the pardon of and reconciliation with Caesar. Brutus 
had already been pardoned and was on his way back from Asia to Rome. He made a stop on 
the island of Samos, and there the two met. According to Cicero who described this meeting, 
they talked about law: Brutus asked Rufus many questions about the extent to which 
pontifical law is connected to civil law.
1
 Unfortunately, Cicero does not provide any details 
about the specific questions Brutus asked, let alone Rufus’ answers, but it is clear that the 
issue was regarded as relevant by both Brutus and Rufus. 
 This story is remarkable in that it seems to contradict the commonly held view that, 
already in the course of the Republic, civil law had become separated from pontifical law, i.e., 
from religion. Early secularisation is even regarded as one of the characteristics of Roman 
law.
2
  The story cannot be discarded as the odd one out, because in other places Cicero also 
quotes leading Roman jurists who stress the importance of being well acquainted with 
pontifical law.
3
 However, verifying the story is difficult because our knowledge of early civil 
law is limited and that of pontifical law problematical. 
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 In the middle of the nineteenth century, Niebuhr suggested that, of old, the pontiffs as 
keepers of law and time used to record major events and decisions.
4
 Although Niebuhr does 
not mention any source, he may have been inspired by Livy’s story about King Numa who 
was said to have entrusted written directions for performing the rites of worship to the newly 
appointed pontiff Numa Marcius.
5
 Niebuhr’s suggestion triggered numerous attempts to 
reconstruct the so-called Priesterbücher, and as many critical comments on these attempts.
6
  
Recently, John Scheid has qualified this phenomenon as ‘the modern myth of the 
Priesterbücher’ and has suggested that Roman religious tradition was mainly oral. In his 
view, it ‘consisted in the combination of two elements: on the one hand, a ritual savoir-faire, 
orally transmitted from father to son, from public officer to public officer, relying on written 
formulas of prayer and an orally enacted calendar; on the other, isolated decisions adapting 
these ritual rules to new situations.’
7
  Focussing on the pontiffs, Scheid suggests that they 
recorded these decisions or regulae in their commentarii. The regulae were never collected or 
systematized into a corpus. According to Scheid, they must have been comparable to the 
opinions given by the jurists on problems of civil law.  
Referring to Magdelain’s research on the early development of civil law, Scheid 
suggests that the procedures used by Roman priests can be reconstructed with the help of civil 
law procedures.
8
 One of the procedures in which the pontiffs were involved was the 
punishment of religious offences. How did they set to work? According to Scheid, the main 
rule was that someone who had intentionally offended a god must be surrendered to that god 
for the sake of vengeance. The procedure that could lead to surrender consisted of two 
elements: the designation of the guilty person and the establishment of guilt. Scheid 
reconstructs the first element by comparing it with noxae deditio (noxal surrender) in civil law 
and international law. For the second element, Scheid refers to a regula of Q. Mucius 
Scaevola the Pontifex in which a distinction is made between an impiety committed 
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intentionally and one committed unintentionally. Here, Scheid does not compare guilt in 
sacred law with guilt in civil law although that would have been possible.  
Scheid seems to combine two aspects of pontifical law and civil law: the way in which 
opinions were recorded and the content of both sets of law. The first aspect is not 
problematical. In the first three centuries of the Republic, the pontiffs were the experts in 
sacred law as well as in civil law. Subsequently, also senators who were not pontiffs started to 
become involved in civil law; they are now known as jurists.
9
 As from the third century BC, 
the jurists wrote down and collected their opinions; however, the oldest texts we know date 
from the end of the second century BC.
10
 They have been preserved because, in the first two 
centuries AD, jurists referred to them in their commentaries and opinions, and because, in the 
sixth century, Emperor Justinian ordered a selection and collection to be made of the works of 
the classical jurists, a compendium which is called the Digest. It is not surprising that, in the 
Digest, most texts stem from the late classical jurists Ulpian and Paul (AD 180-220); only a 
limited number of texts have their origin in the Roman Republic. It is more than likely that the 
early jurists recorded their opinions in the same way as the pontiffs had theirs; in fact, the 
jurists of the late Republic often were also pontiffs. 
The second aspect of Scheid’s reconstruction, however, is very problematical. Did 
pontifical law and civil law share content? If they did, it may be possible to reconstruct 
pontifical law with the help of civil and international law. However, if they did not, it does not 
mean that there was no connection between pontifical law and civil law. The interaction 
between both sets of law may have taken place on a different level. Therefore, the question is 
whether the method applied by Scheid is adequate for the problem he tackled 
In the following, I shall study Scheid’s reconstruction from the point-of-view of 
Roman law. First, I shall deal with the comparison of noxae deditio in sacred, civil, and 
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international law. Then, I shall compare Scaevola’s regula on impiety with a responsum that 
the same Scaevola gave in a (civil law) case of unlawful damage.  
 
2. Noxae deditio in sacred, civil, and international law 
 
Scheid reconstructs the designation of the guilty person in sacred law with the help of noxae 
deditio in civil and international law. He assumes that, in the later Republic, noxae deditio 
was applied in all three areas of law. First, Scheid summarily describes the noxae deditio in 
civil and international law, and then he compares it with that in sacred law.  
In civil law, noxae deditio is a well known concept. Unfortunately, its early history is 
shrouded in mist. Scheid refers to the reconstruction by the Belgian Romanist Fernand de 
Visscher. In his book entitled ‘Le régime de la noxalité en droit romain’ which was published 
in 1947, De Visscher distinguished two phases (I shall quote Scheid’s translation of this 
passage): ‘the first phase begins as soon as the crime is committed. During this phase, the 
deditio noxae is only the right or the means of the group for escaping the impending 
vengeance. During this period the group can be freed by the exile or dimissio, the repudiation 
or the denial of the guilty person as well as by any other act implying the ending of social 
contact with him. The second phase starts with the summons by the victim or his parents. The 
group of the guilty person now is forced to hand him over. From now on, the group can only 
be freed by a noxae deditio to the victim or the victim’s group.’
11
 According to De Visscher, 
the obligation of noxae deditio was never sanctioned by a civil action, but only by the 
coercive means of the magistrate: public authority simply substituted collective vengeance.
12
 





 For noxae deditio in international law, Scheid also refers to De Visscher. According to 
the latter, international deditio is closely related to that of civil law.
14
 It shows (again, I quote 
Scheid’s  translation) that ‘if, in circumstances in which the international customs consider it 
efficacious, the offered deditio is refused by the offended state, it will be sufficient to free the 
state of the guilty person from every guilt, even if its response is limited only to the expulsion 
of the guilty person from the city.’ Scheid illustrates this statement with the famous case of 
the consul Hostilius Mancinus who, in 137 BC, had been surrendered by the Romans to the 
Iberian city of Numantia but had not been accepted.
15
  In the Senate, P. Mucius Scaevola 
argued that the deditio was a deed of sovereignty of the Roman people that was independent 
from the receptio. Scheid concludes that the Roman authorities, by publicly recognizing the 
offence and its author, carried out the derelictio and ended the social contact with the guilty 
party.  
 Now let us turn to sacred law. According to Scheid, in archaic Rome, the deditio 
noxae as described by De Visscher, also applied in the case of a divine offence. The guilty 
person became impius and was excluded from public and religious life. The community 
would hand him over to the offended god who could take vengeance if he so chose.
16
 In this 
way, the community could free itself from every responsibility.
17
 The impius, however, could 
not expiate himself.  
 According to Mommsen and Wissowa, the second century BC saw a softening of the 
traditional sternness of Roman religion.
18
 On the basis of three inscriptions of the time - two 
containing regulations for sacred groves near Spoleto and Luceria and one containing a law  
for the Jupiter temple in Furfo, all located in Central or South Italy - they assumed that the 
penalties for all religious offences were relaxed.
19  
According to Scheid, however, the 
regulations only show that a guilty person could expiate an unintentional offence by offering a 
sacrifice; he could also pay a fine for having violated a public regulation and then a priest 
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should expiate the offence by offering a piaculum. The intentional offences remained 
inexpiable.
20
 Around 100 BC, the jurist and pontifex maximus Q. Mucius Scaevola confirmed 
these rules; the only innovation he introduced was to make it possible for the unintentional 
offender to repair the damage done and to expiate his deed himself. The sanction for an 
intentional offence remained surrender to the injured party, i.e., to the offended god, in order 
that the god be permitted to take vengeance on the offender. According to Scheid, this noxae 
deditio of sacred law survived until the end of the first century AD, when the emperor’s 
intrusion into civil life limited the scope of vengeance.
21
 He concludes that the divine right to 
take vengeance, as acknowledged by the deditio of the intentional impius, should not be 
regarded as only an archaic institution. 
 Whereas De Visscher considered noxae deditio as a remnant of a period when the 
settlement of conflicts between more or less independent groups was realized by agreements 
on specific details rather than by legal solutions founded on a common norm, Scheid extends 
this interpretation to historical times.
22
  He suggests that noxae deditio can be considered 
simply as a form of political settlement that allowed private or international vengeance to be 
taken. The question is, however, whether noxae deditio in civil law is comparable to deditio in 
international and sacred law. I will first consider noxae deditio in civil law and then deal in 
more detail with the deditio of Mancinus and international law.  
 
2.1 Noxae deditio in civil law 
When a modern law student consults a textbook on Roman private law, he is bound to find a 
description of noxae deditio that is very different from that of Scheid. In the latter case, it is 
always connected with vengeance, in the former it is treated in the context of the liability of a 
pater familias or a dominus for a delict committed by his son or slave. In his Institutes, Gaius 
describes it in the following way: 
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Gai. Inst. 4.75  
Ex maleficiis filiorum familias servorumque, veluti si furtum fecerint aut iniuriam 
commiserint, noxales actiones proditae sunt, uti liceret patri dominove aut litis 
aestimationem suffere aut noxae dedere. Erat enim iniquum nequitiam eorum ultra 
ipsorum corpora parentibus dominisve damnosam esse. 
“Wrongdoing by sons or slaves, as where they have been guilty of theft or outrage, has 
given rise to noxal actions, the nature of which is that the father or master  is allowed 
either to bear the damages awarded or to surrender  the offender. For it would be 
inequitable that their misconduct should involve their parents or masters in loss 




In classical Roman law, the pater familias or dominus would be held liable for delicts 
committed by his son or slave, but he could limit his responsibility by surrendering the son or 
slave to the injured party. What is crucial is that the choice between paying the fine or 
surrendering the son or slave was up to the defendant. The praetor would include this choice 
in the formula. If the defendant opted for noxae deditio, because paying the damage would 
cost him much more than the value of the slave, the slave (or son) had to be handed over by 
means of a formal act, the mancipatio or the in iure cessio.  
 Next to nothing is known about the rules of noxae deditio in earlier law.
24
 The 
reconstruction by De Visscher discussed above is well-known, but not generally accepted.
25
  
Moreover, his reconstruction comprises more than Scheid wants us to believe. In fact, De 
Visscher distinguishes four different procedures in Roman law . The earliest procedure was 
(1) the pre-legal one; it was soon followed by (2) the legal system of noxality; in early 
classical Roman law, the system of noxal actions (3) was developed, whereas in postclassical 
law, the regime of noxality underwent (4) deformations. De Visscher assumed that the older, 
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pre-legal procedure was not displaced by the younger, legal ones but continued to exist.
26
 In 
the second stage (i.e., that of the legal system of noxality), the victim’s side had a right to 
demand the surrender of the wrongdoer, but the group sheltering the latter was allowed to buy 
them off by offering compensation. At some quite early date, when the legis actio procedure 
was still dominant, the system of actiones noxales was introduced: now the wrongdoer or his 
group was obliged to pay compensation but they were allowed to surrender the wrongdoer to 
the victim.  
It is particularly the first procedure as proposed by De Visscher that has been rejected 
by other Romanists. Several other attempts at reconstruction have been made.
27
  Max Kaser, 
for instance, developed another theory based on Noxalhaftung: the idea that noxal liability 
was created by the delict itself.
28
  The problem is – as usual – that there are hardly any sources 
for archaic Roman law so that it is impossible to know anything about the origin of this 
special form of liability with any amount of certainty.
29
  
 Scheid only refers to the first procedure described by De Visscher, i.e., to the pre-legal 
phase about which nothing is known. If, one day, De Visscher’s reconstruction will turn out to 
be correct, Scheid’s comparison will hold for the early Roman Republic. However, the noxae 
deditio of classical Roman law belongs to the third procedure described by De Visscher. It 
was used for different offences (e.g., theft, damage to property), for different persons (not for 
those who were free and sui iuris), and for a different purpose (limitation of liability of a 
pater familias or dominus for delicts committed by a son or slave). Moreover, Roman 
criminal law did not know noxae deditio as a way of punishment either.
30
 Therefore, the 
noxae deditio in civil law does not seem to have any connection with deditio in sacred law. 
 
2.2 Noxae deditio in international law 
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For noxal surrender in an international context, Scheid mentions the famous case of 
Mancinus. The story behind it has come down to us in several sources: it has been told by 
historians like Appian and Plutarch,
31
 but the deditio aspect has been described most 
extensively by Cicero. In the first book of his De oratore, he makes Crassus tell the story of 
Mancinus as an example of important cases where actions involving civil rights turn upon 
points of law.  
  
 Cicero, De oratore I 181  
Etenim sic C. Mancinum, nobilissimum atque optimum virum, ac consularem, cum 
eum propter invidiam Numantini foederis pater patratus ex S.C. Numantinis 
dedidisset, eumque illi non recepissent, posteaque Mancinus domum revenisset, neque 
in senatum introire dubitasset; P. Rutilius, M. filius tribunus plebis, de senatu iussit 
educi, quod eum civem negaret esse; quia memoria sic esset proditum, quem pater 
suus, aut populus vendidisset, aut pater patratus dedidisset, ei nullum esse 
postliminium. 
“For in truth such was the experience of Gaius Mancinus, a man of the highest rank 
and character and a past consul, who under a decree of the  Senate had been delivered 
up to the Numantines by the pater patratus, for concluding an unpopular treaty with 
their nation, and whose surrender they had refused to accept, whereupon he returned 
home and unhesitating commons, ordered him to be removed, affirming that he was no 
citizen in view of the traditional rule that a man sold by his father or by the people, or 




From the other sources we know that, in 137 BC, the consul C. Hostilius Mancinus had been 
defeated in several battles by the Numantines, in Hispania Citerior, and that finally his army 
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had been encircled by them. A peace treaty was made, but our sources differ as to the person 
who represented Rome. According to Appian, it was Mancinus who bound himself by an oath 
to this agreement.
33
 Plutarch, however, states that Mancinus’ quaestor Tiberius Gracchus 
made the treaty thereby saving the lives of some 20,000 Roman citizens.
34
 At Rome, the 
treaty was considered humiliating, and it was denounced as a disaster and as a disgrace to the 
name of Rome. The people decided that the consul Mancinus should be delivered up to the 
Numantines, but for Tiberius’ sake all the other officers were spared.
35
  
 Mancinus was taken back to Spain by the pater patratus, the head of the fetial 
priests.
36
 He was left before the gate of Numantia, stripped and in chains. However the 
Numantines refused to accept him and, at night fall, he was taken back to the Roman camp.  
 Mancinus returned to Rome. He wanted to enter the Senate-house again but was 
ordered out by the tribune of the people P. Rutilius. Comparing the surrender of Mancinus up 
by the pater patratus with the case of the man who was sold by his father or by the people, 
Rutilius stated that he had no right of restoration. From other sources, we know that his case 
was hotly debated in the Senate: P. Mucius Scaevola took the side of Rutilius and maintained 
that Mancinus was no longer citizen. He was like an exile; he could only be restored in his 
rights as a citizen when the Roman people would ‘receive’ him again.
37
 M. Iunius Brutus, on 
the other hand, argued that Mancinus had never lost his citizenship because like a gift, a 
deditio was not complete until it had been accepted.
38
 Rutilius and Scaevola won the day, but 
a year later, the Roman people restored Mancinus as citizen and senator, and even elected him 
as praetor. 
 Following De Visscher (and, indirectly, Rutilius and Scaevola), Scheid considers the 
deditio of Mancinus as a deed of sovereignty on the Roman side that was independent from 
the reception, the formal acceptance, by the injured city. Both De Visscher and Scheid assume 
that Mancinus had committed perjury and that his deditio noxae was considered an expiation 
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that would free the Roman people of the responsibility for this perjury. Scheid suggests that, 
when one transposes this case into a religious situation, one could say that, by recognizing the 
status of an inexpiable impius as that of the author of a crime against the gods, the Roman 
people freed itself from every responsibility.
39
 
 I do not agree with this analysis. First, I do not think that Mancinus had committed 
perjury: it seems it was Tiberius Gracchus and not Mancinus who had made the treaty with 
the Numantines and, moreover, it was not Mancinus but the Roman people that broke the 
treaty. Consequently, the Romans were unfair both against Mancinus and against the 
Numantines. It seems they used the deditio in order to expiate a perjury they themselves 
committed. Therefore, in terms of the noxae deditio of civil law, there was no damage 
committed by a subordinate person. 
 Second, I doubt whether deditio can be considered as a deed of sovereignty of the 
Roman people. Sometimes it will have worked like that, for instance in 188 BC, when Lucius 
Minucius Myrtilus and Lucius Manlius were said to have beaten Carthaginian ambassadors 
and were delivered by the fetials to the ambassadors and taken to Carthage.
40
 If they would 
have been refused by the Carthaginians, Livy – who mentions this event – would have told us 
so.
 
In other cases, however, the dediti were refused, for instance by the Samnites (in 321 BC, 
after the battle at the Caudine Forks) and by the Numantines.
41
   
 In my view, deditio was a religious concept that could be used for political ends.
42
 Its 
effect was determined by political power. It is striking indeed that no case of deditio is known 
to have taken place after 137 BC. Only once, in 55 BC, the subject came up for discussion 
again, when Cato wanted Caesar to be handed over to two Gallic tribes for having violated a 
truce.
43
 The decline of deditio can very well be explained by the rise of Rome’s political 
power. The fact that it is political power that determines who decides whether the deditus will 
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be accepted shows that international deditio is basically different from the noxae deditio of 
civil law. 
 Third, there is an even more important reason that makes me doubt whether, in the 
case of Mancinus, it is right to speak of noxae deditio.
44
 In the sources, only the words dedere, 
deditus, and deditio are used.
45
 In the other cases of surrender of a general, the word noxa is 
not used in combination with deditio either.
46
  
 In my view, the Mancinus case does not confirm the existence of a noxae deditio in 
international law. It only shows that deditio in international law resembles deditio in sacred 
law. My conclusion, therefore, must be that there is not one and the same noxae deditio in 
civil, international, and religious law. Noxae deditio was part of civil law and implied 
restriction of liability for damage done by one’s son or slave. It had nothing to do with deditio 
in religious and international law.  
 
3. The regula of Q. Mucius Scaevola 
 
The second example of the close connection between civil law and pontifical law mentioned 
by Scheid is the so-called regula of Q. Mucius Scaevola. It has come down to us via Varro 
(116-27 BC) and Macrobius (fifth century AD). I will quote both texts.  
  
Varro, De Lingua Latina 6.30 
Praetor qui tum fatus est, si imprudens fecit, piaculari hostia facta piatur, si prudens 
dixit, Q. Mucius aiebat eum expiari ut impium non posse. 
“The praetor who has spoken at such a time, purifies himself by the sacrifice of an 
atoning victim, if he did it unknowingly; but if he spoke knowingly, Q. Mucius said 
that he could not atone for his offence, being impius.” 
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 Macrobius, Saturnalia 1.16.9-11 
Adfirmabant autem sacerdotes pollui ferias, si indictis conceptisque opus aliquod 
fieret. Praeterea regem sacrorum flaminesque non licebat videre feriis opus fieri, et 
ideo per praeconem denuntiabant, ne quid tale ageretur: et praecepti neglegens 
multabatur. 10. Praeter multam vero adfirmabatur eum, qui talibus diebus (i.e. festis) 
imprudens aliquid egisset, porco piaculum dare debere. Prudentem expiari non posse 
Scaevola pontifex adseverabat, sed Umbro negat eum pollui, qui opus vel ad deos 
pertinens sacrorumque causa fecisset vel aliquid ad urgentem vitae utilitatem 
respiciens actitasset. 11. Scaevola denique consultus, quod feriis agi liceret, 
respondit: quod praetermissum noceret…. 
“[9] The priests used to maintain that a rest day was desecrated if, after it had been 
duly promulgated and proclaimed, any work was done on it. Furthermore, the rex 
sacrorum and the flamines might not see work in progress on a rest day, and for this 
reason they would give public warning by a herald that nothing of the sort should be 
done. Neglect of the command was punished by a fine, [10] and it was said that he 
who had unknowingly done any work on such days, had – in addition to the fine –  to 
make atonement by the sacrifice of a pig. For work done knowingly no atonement 
could be made, according to the pontiff Scaevola, but Umbro says that to have done 
work that concerns the gods or is connected with a religious ceremony, or any work of 
urgent and vital importance does not defile the doer. [11] Scaevola, in fact, when 
asked what might be done on a rest day replied that anything might be done which it 





Varro’s text is the oldest one. A praetor had done official business on a dies fastus. By doing 
so, he had committed sacrilege. When his mistake was discovered, he wanted to make 
atonement. He may have turned to the pontifices for advice. One of them, identified as Q. 
Mucius, distinguished between the case of the praetor having intentionally violated religious 
rules and the case of his doing so unintentionally: in the latter case, he could expiate himself 
by the sacrifice of an atoning victim, in the former case he could not.  
 From Macrobius’ text, it can be deduced that the Q. Mucius mentioned by Varro must 
have been the pontiff Q. Mucius Scaevola. It is not clear who the other advisor, Umbro, may 
have been. Scheid calls both Scaevola and Umbro jurists but no jurist of the name Umbro is 
referred to in the sources. He may just as easily have been another pontiff. The case as 
described by Macrobius differs in two ways from the one described by Varro: first, the person 
committing the sacrilege is not specified as a praetor, and second, the consequences of the 
sacrilege are less severe in that both Umbro and Scaevola toned down Scaevola’s original 
advice by allowing exceptions for work connected to religious ceremonies and other 
important work. It is not clear whether these differences are based on a different view in 
Macrobius’ day or whether they are just accidental. 
 In both texts, the words prudens and imprudens are used to qualify the way in which 
the sacrilege had been committed. They are adjectives connected with the noun  prudentia, all 
words deriving from pro-videre. It is clear that providentia is coterminous with divinatio, as 
Santangelo remarks elsewhere in this volume. He describes the word prudens as follows: ‘The 
word prudens is very suitable to convey the concept of a deliberate action: it indicates the 
conduct of someone who is aware of the implications of an action, and can foresee its 
consequences.’
48
 In other words, prudens is not an equivalent of dolo (‘to have the intention 
to commit sacrilege’) but has a broader meaning. By using this word, Scaevola (and Umbro) 
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were able to allow exceptions to the rule that someone who works on a dies fastus commits 
sacrilege.
49
   
 It is striking that the regula of Scaevola is well-known among the students of Roman 
religion whereas students of Roman law will hardly know of its existence.
50
 On the other 
hand, it seems that students of Roman religion do not realize that the same Q. Mucius 
Scaevola introduced a similar distinction into civil law, namely between intentionally and 
unintentionally committing a delict.
51
 Students of Roman law, and particularly of the Roman 
law of obligations, are quite familiar with this distinction.   
 In Roman law, a delict was a source of obligation for which the praetor would grant an 
action against the guilty person or his pater familias/dominus. In the Law of the XII Tables, 
the delicts furtum (theft) and iniuria (physical injury) are mentioned; there was only theft or 
injury when it had been committed with dolus (intentionally). The lex Aquilia of 286 BC 
introduced the delict of damnum iniuria datum (damage to property). We do not know how, 
originally, the word iniuria in this delict was interpreted. According to Jolowicz and Nicholas, 
it meant non iure, ‘in the sense that once it was proved that the defendant had caused the 




 The earliest jurist known to have interpreted this word was Q. Mucius Scaevola. His 
opinion is quoted in a famous text of the jurist Paul on a tree-lopper who threw branches on 
the ground and thereby killed a slave. Scaevola compared a number of situations, each time 
indicating whether the tree-lopper was liable under the lex Aquilia: 
  
 Paul, Dig. 9.2.31 
 Si putator ex arbore ramum cum deiceret vel machinarius hominempraetereuntem 
occidit, ita tenetur, si is in publicum decidat nec ille proclamavit, ut casus eius evitari 
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possit. Sed Mucius etiam dixit, si in privato idem accidisset, posse de culpa agi: 
culpam autem esse, quod cum a diligente provideri poterit, non esset provisum aut tum 
denuntiatum esset, cum periculum evitari non possit. Secundum quam rationem non 
multum refert, per publicum an per privatum iter fieret, cum plerumque per private 
loca volgo iter fiat. Quod si nullum iter erit, dolum dumtaxat praestare debet, ne 
immittat in eum, quem viderit transeuntem: nam culpa ab eo exigenda non est, dum 
divinare non potuerit, an per eum locum aliquis transiturus sit.  
“If a pruner threw down a branch from a tree and killed a slave passing underneath 
(the same applies to a man working on a scaffold), he is liable only if it falls down in a 
public place and he failed to shout a warning so that the accident could be avoided. 
But Mucius says that even if the accident occurred  in a private place, an action can be 
brought if his conduct is blameworthy; and  he thinks there is fault when what could 
have been foreseen by a diligent person, was not foreseen or when a warning was 
shouted too late for the danger to be avoided. Following the same reasoning, it does 
not matter much whether the deceased was making his way through a public or a 
private place, as the general public often make their way across private places. But if 
there is no path, the defendant should be liable only for positive wrongdoing, so he 
should not throw anything at someone he sees passing by; but, on the other hand, he is 
not to be deemed blameworthy when he could not have guessed that someone was 
about to pass through that place.”
53
   
 
It is striking that Scaevola does not use the word iniuria but, instead, culpa to qualify the 
causing of damage. His description of culpa: ‘there is fault when what could have been 
foreseen by a diligent person but was not foreseen’ has become standard, as well in Roman 
times as in modern times. In this case, the tree-lopper was liable for killing the slave when he 
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could have foreseen that someone would walk underneath the tree he was lopping and yet did 
not shout a warning. Only when there was no path and when there was no reason to expect 
someone to walk by did he not need to shout. But, of course, he would be liable if he would 
intentionally throw a branch at someone passing by: then he would be acting with dolus.  
 It is generally assumed that this interpretation of iniuria as culpa was new, and that, 
from then on, persons who not intentionally but through negligence caused damage to 
someone else’s property were liable to pay a penalty. In this way, Scaevola considerably 
increased liability under the lex Aquilia. 
 Both in his legal responsum and in his pontifical regula, Q. Mucius Scaevola 
distinguished between intentional and unintentional behaviour, but he did so using different 
concepts and aiming at different effects. In pontifical law, he used the word prudens in a 
sense that is reminiscent of the derivation of pro-videre, i.e. being able to foresee the 
consequences of an action and so behaving in a well-considered way. He thereby introduced a 
more lenient criterion for deciding whether sacrilege had been committed or not. For civil 
law, however, Scaevola did the reverse: by interpreting iniuria in the sense of culpa, he 
extended liability under the lex Aquilia. From now on, not only was someone who 
intentionally caused damage to someone else’s property liable, but so too was someone who 
did not intend to do so, but could have foreseen the consequences of his behaviour. Providere, 
to foresee, is the keyword, but its meaning vis-à-vis the gods is different from that vis-à-vis 
human property. 
 Both rules have come down to us, but in very different ways. The responsum on 
iniuria has been preserved in the Digest of Justinian, in a text by the jurist Paul (turn of the 
third century). It came to form part of a legal literature that expanded along with the Empire. 
But it is only thanks to Justinian that we know this along with so many other responsa from 
the classical jurists; if it were not for him, we would have known only a handful of texts 
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through fourth and fifth century collections such as the Pauli Sententiae, the Fragmenta 
Vaticana, and the lex Romana Visigothorum.  
 We know the regula on impietas thanks to Varro and Macrobius. It did not form part 
of a pontifical literature for, as Scheid points out, both authors were scholars and antiquarians, 
not priests.
54
 In his view, there has never been a pontifical literature. Augustus may have tried  
to reconstruct the rules regarding religious institutions that had been abandoned and neglected 
for two or three generations, but his attempt came too late. All sorts of religions had been and 
were introduced in Rome during the expansion of the Empire, Roman religion was only one 
among many, even though it was a very important one. The rise of Christianity put an end to 
all that.  
 That Justinian as emperor of the Greek speaking Eastern Roman Empire in the sixth 
century ordered the Digest – a collection of Latin texts from the first two centuries AD – to be 
put together, may in itself be hard to understand. However, it does make sense that, as head of 
the Christian Church, he did not order the pontifical decisions of pagan Rome to be collected 




The central question in this contribution is the extent to which pontifical law was connected 
with civil law. According to Scheid, they had enough in common to allow us to reconstruct 
procedures of pontifical law with the help of civil law procedures. By way of example, he 
reconstructed the punishment of a religious offence. For the first element of this procedure, 
the designation of the guilty person, he used the noxae deditio in civil and international law to 
explain deditio in sacral law. However, from the point-of-view of Roman law, this 
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comparison does not hold. The deditio in sacred and international law cannot be identified 
with noxae deditio in civil law, for they were two basically different concepts.  
 For the second element, the establishment of guilt, Scheid used a regula of the jurist 
and pontiff Q. Mucius Scaevola who modified the existing distinction between intentional and 
unintentional wrongdoing in sacred law in order to relax the rules. The same Scaevola 
introduced the same distinction in civil law, but in order to harden the rules.  
 The conclusion must be that there is only a parallel in procedures in a non-technical 
sense. In the Roman republic, sacred law and civil law were closely linked because they were 
created and interpreted by the same persons using the same methods. However, they differed 
as to subject matter and purpose and therefore they remained two separate sets of law. To 
what extent there was interaction between pontifical law and civil law at the level of 
substantive law remains to be seen. 
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